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This article posits four key challenges to address the question as to
why logistics reform in Communist-legacy defense institutions has
been so slow. First, what is the conceptual foundation for logistics
in these countries? Second, what is the general state of national
logistics capabilities in these countries? Third, why has the reform
of logistics in these post-Communist legacy defense institutions
been so slow and superficial? Fourth, in an attempt to understand
the problembetter, what do legacy defense institutions need to do
themselves in order to be able to adopt modern Western logistics
concepts? Conversely, what do donor nations need to understand
about these legacy logistics organizations the better to enable
them to understand the immense gap that divides Communist
from Western logistics concepts? In addressing these questions,
the author will argue two points. First, logistics reform has been
impeded to date by a lack of appreciation on thepart of particularly
Western officials that legacy logistics concepts could not be more
antithetical to theirWestern counterparts. Second, reformof legacy
logistics organizations will not follow from attention and resources
directed at tactical-level formations and importing the expedition-
ary logistics concept. Rather, the causation of the continued inabil-
ity to adopt Western logistics concepts can be found in national-
level policy, financing, laws, and regulations that continue to
enable the operation of legacy concepts.
Introduction
One would be on solid footing to observe that when surveying post-
Communist defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, one of the
least reformed, and arguably most resistant to change, element is their
‘logistics’1 organizations. By this, while other elements of these institutions
have adopted some Western defense and military concepts (e.g., operation
plans for those countries now in NATO), logistic support concepts, organi-
zations, and their logic remain, to varying degrees, based on legacy supply,
acquisition, and defense industrial concepts and assumptions. It is not too far
CONTACT Thomas-Durell Young tdyoung@nps.edu Senior Lecturer, Department of National Security
Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 1 University Circle, Monterey, CA 93943.
1The author recognizes that the Western concept of logistics is hardly applicable to its legacy counterpart, and this
point is explained at length in the essay. However, for the purpose of clarity, the term logistics is used both within
its Western definition as well as its legacy counterpart, except where specified.
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a stretch to suggest, therefore, that these legacy practices are, in fact, not
supportive of the Western approach to maneuver warfare and decentralized
command. While perhaps an extreme case, the all but complete failure of
Ukrainian logistics capabilities (vide infra) in Kyiv’s response to Russia’s
invasion of the Crimea and support of separatists in eastern Ukraine presage
the types of potential problems new NATO members and PfP Partners face
when attempting to support their forces in the field. Moreover, in addition to
its incompatibility with the Western approach to warfare, legacy logistics is
also arguably inefficient, particularly in those countries that continue to
maintain large government-owned defense industries that produce and/or
support legacy weapons and systems.
To the credit of Western nations and NATO, support has been provided to
these countries to reform their logistics organizations, but success has been
problematic for a variety of reasons. Western assistance in this area has been
largely subsumed by supporting troop contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan,
but this assistance has been almost exclusively within the realm of expedi-
tionary logistics. Such support, therefore, has had little corresponding effect
on changing national-level legacy concepts, assumptions, and logic.
Notwithstanding some efforts to conduct logistics exercises, e.g., NATO’s
LOGEX command post exercise (which addresses multinational logistical
support of operations),2 effective support to reform these legacy organiza-
tions has been hampered by intensive conceptual dissonance.
In light of the lack of progress in the area of logistics reform, this article
posits four key questions. First, what is the conceptual foundation for
logistics in these countries? Second, what is the current state of national
logistics capabilities in these countries? The article will present representative
data of a variety of armed forces in order to provide a general understanding
of their underdevelopment. Third, why has reform of logistics in these post-
Communist legacy defense institutions been so slow and superficial? To be
sure, reform of these institutions to enable them to adopt Western defense
and military concepts has been meager in essentially every other elements of
these organizations. However, both in terms of organizations and operating
concepts, it would appear that legacy logistics organizations possess prodi-
gious antibodies against Western concepts. Fourth, in light of understanding
the problem better, what do legacy defense institutions need to do themselves
in order for them to adopt modern Western logistics concepts? And, by
extension, what do NATO and donor nations need to understand about these
legacy logistics organizations the better to inform them when providing
advice and assistance?
As to the ongoing dissonance regarding logistics within these defense institu-
tions, the author will argue two points. First, fundamentally, logistics reform has
2See, for example, information on Exercise LOGEX 2013 at http://www.nspa.nato.int/en/news/news-20130214.htm.
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been impeded to date by a lack of appreciation on the part of particularlyWestern
donor nations that legacy logistics concepts could not be more antithetical to their
Western counterparts. Thus, in countries that desire reform, Western concepts
have been very difficult to adopt, while in those countries that have been less keen
to do so, the ‘rot’ has been allowed to fester that has diminished capabilities and
allowed corrupt practices. Second, reform of legacy logistics organizations cannot
occur solely from advice and assistance provided to tactical-level formations and
importing the expeditionary logistics concept. These approaches have manifestly
failed to reform these organizations in a fundamentalmanner. Rather, causation of
the continued inability to adopt Western logistics concepts can be found in
national-level policy, financing, laws, and regulations that continue to implement
legacy concepts. In the end, Western advice and assistance will continue to be ill
utilized until such time that these national-level elements are identified and slatted
for retirement and replaced by their Western counterparts as enshrined in
national-level policy.
Conceptual basis of Communist logistics
The provenance of all Communist concepts of logistics is Soviet. Logistics, or
perhaps better to use its more specific nomenclature— procurement, acquisition,
defense industry, and supply — was completely reconceptualized by the Soviets
during the 1930s in order to align the Soviet economy to support the Red Army in
protecting and spreading the Revolution. Schneider argues that the Soviet concept
of logistics has no counterpart in the West, as it is emblematic of the scientifically
demanding and comprehensiveness of the Soviet concept of warfighting. He
argues that the Soviets defined logistics as larger than the management of the
support of forces but rather conceptualized it in a much broader expanse to
encompass the entire nation. At the first level, Soviet planners examined compre-
hensively the military aspects of the nation’s economy. Through rigorous analysis
of the foundations of war and the economy, principles of ‘Military Economic
Science’ were developed. The second level examined, through the use of elaborate
tools and techniques from central economic planning, how all of these economic
inputs (commerce, industrial production, labor, and capital) could bemobilized to
supportmilitary operations. The third and final level combined these factors into a
core theory of ‘military economic logistics’: how the armed forces canmobilize the
resources of the state.3 In practical terms, these factors were integrated into what is
still called in many post-Communist legacy defense institutions, ‘Rear Area’,
which contains and manages all military support and sustainment. To aid in a
Western understanding, one should think of Soviet legacy ‘logistics’ as wartime
host-nation support (HNS) but on a hefty dose of steroids.
3J. J. Schneider, ‘The Origins of Soviet Military Science’, Journal of Soviet Military Studies, 2(4) (1989), p. 498.
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More specifically, conceptually Soviet Military Economic Science turns its
Western counterpart of logistics essentially on its head. The General Staff
determined what the nation was to contribute to create and support the
armed forces. In consequence, completely absent in the Soviet understanding
is the basic principles of liberal democratic governance that the armed forces
are an extension of, not apart from, society, let alone from its economy. As a
further distinction, in the West it is tactical- and operational-level comman-
ders who determine logistical requirements of their forces to meet their
assigned missions. This is completely antithetical to the Soviet and indeed,
most post-Communist, armed forces. Communist doctrine holds that armed
forces deploy with extreme logistics limitations (10 to 12 days), and replen-
ishment is envisaged to be pushed forward from static support depots
controlled by the Rear Area, while equipment and battle casualties were
recovered rearward to these same facilities. Except for its most elementary
aspects, maintenance of platforms and systems was the responsibility of
defense industry. In sum, the Rear Area in all of its aspects was and remains
as centralized as physically possible.4 In contradistinction, whereas Western
armed forces employ the principle of ‘pull’ logistics, the Soviet logistic
concept (determined by mass effects) was based on the principle of centra-
lized operational planning and execution to support a short, quick offensive
campaign, i.e., ‘push’ logistics, via a forward-distribution system.5 This tradi-
tion has its antecedents in Tsarist times, when one considers the realities
faced by military authorities: the immense size of the country and the huge
differences between the small educated, professional officer corps and masses
of peasant soldiers — concepts that ensured that centralized control was the
only functional option.6 During Communism, this centralization of power
was expanded, thereby solidifying this phenomenon in the area of military
logistics.
It is important to stress the fundamental conceptual differences between
Western and Soviet ‘logistics’ for a number or reasons. Most importantly,
Military Economic Science in many legacy defense institutions remains
largely untouched by Western thinking, Ukraine being perhaps a prime
example. Even in those countries where the adoption of Western concepts
has been more successful, one can still find logistics assumptions premised
on aspects of Military Economic Science (e.g., centralization of control).
Given the antithetical nature of these two concepts (i.e., logistics and
Military Economic Science), it is all but impossible to enable mutual
4G. H. Turbiville, Jr., ‘Sustaining Theater Strategic Operations’, Journal of Soviet Military Studies, 1(1) (1988), pp.
81–107.
5J. Hemsley, ‘The Soviet Ground Forces’, in J. Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Soviet Miltary Power and
Performance, Archon Books, Hamdon, CT, 1979, pp. 66–67.
6N. Stone, The Historical Background of the Red Army’, in J. Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Soviet Military
Power and Performance, Archon Books, Hamdon, CT, 1979, pp. 14–15.
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understanding between Western and Communist legacy military officers and
defense officials. Indeed, it can be just short of comical to watch such
exchanges given the diametrically opposed ways in which the two systems
perceive the most basic concepts of supporting the armed forces. It is little
wonder, therefore, that in a classical Communist-model General Staff, there
is no G-4, ‘Directorate of Logistics’, as logistics planning is subsumed by
operational planning conducted at the national level, and support is defined
as a civil responsibility. In consequence, one finds responsibilities for logistics
often embedded within legacy (e.g., the Material Resources Sector in Serbia),7
or newly formed Ministries of Defense (e.g., Department of Armament and
Military Acquisition and Development in Ukraine).8
When examining Warsaw Pact and Yugoslav concepts of logistics, one finds
that the former adhered very closely to that of the Soviet model, whereas its
application in the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) produced some notable
differences. As to the former, support of the armed forces was molded in the
exact image of these organizations’ Soviet counterparts, with the added feature
that much of the armed forces’ materiel requirements was either supplied by
the Soviet Union or produced in-country under agreement with Moscow.9 The
only differences between Warsaw Pact and Soviet forces in terms of logistics is
that in the former, their stocks were lower than possessed by Soviet forces.
The JNA logistical system was named ‘Rear Security,’ which contained all the
elements of logistic support for the JNA and the individual republics’ Territorial
Defense Forces. In addition to traditional logistics, Rear Security included
considerable institutional elements of the defense institution (e.g., musical,
legal, geodetic services, and even military police).10 There appears to have
been a uniquely Yugoslav approach to logistics that was a hybrid of
Communist central control but with some elements of a ‘pull’ logistics concept.
Of all European Communist armed forces, it is the only one that was influenced
byWesternmilitary assistance. The US armed forces established a large technical
assistance program that spanned the 1950s and constituted a major step toward
its modernization.11 A US American Military Assistance Staff, Yugoslavia was
established (comprising some 30 officers and commanded by a General Officer),
which was responsible for providing materiel to the JNA, as well as for the
training on the use of these modern weapon systems (e.g., F-86 and F-84
7Serbia, Ministry of Defense, Defense Policy Sector, White Paper on the Defense of the Republic of Serbia, Media
Center ‘Odbrana’, Belgrade, 2010, pp. 105–114.
8Ukraine, Ministry of Defense, White Book 2014: The Armed Forces of Ukraine, Kyiv, 2015, p. 73.
9For an excellent treatment of how Soviet thinking was played out in operational planning see C. Donnelly, Red
Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey, 1988, pp.
261–267.
10Yugoslavia’s Armed Forces, Narodna Armija, Belgrade, 1980, pp. 122–143.
11See B. Dimitrijevic, ‘The Mutual Defense Aid Program in Tito’s Yugoslavia, 1951–1958, and Its Technical Impact’,
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 10(2) (1997), pp. 19–33; and ‘Military Assistance Agreement between the United
States and Yugoslavia’, 14 November 1951, US Department of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements
(TIAS), 2349; 2 UST 2254.
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Thunderjet fighters, M-36 Jackson tank destroyers). The total cost of the assis-
tance package was approximately USD750,000,000.12 That said, it is reported
that the JNA experienced considerable trouble using US-provided equipment as
it tried to understand and implement Western logistics concepts (particularly
supply) in the 1950s.13 But some Western logistics traditions and concepts
remain in practice even as the JNA progressively acquired proportionally
more Soviet equipment after the early 1960s. What must also be assessed as
significant is the role played by individual republics’ Territorial Defense Forces,
which were created in 1969. Each possessed their own headquarters and was
completely independent in terms of operations, and they possessed decentra-
lized logistics planning and depots.14 However, the quid pro quo for such
autonomy on the part of these Republic forces included the accompanying
financial exposure to provide for their own logistic support.15 This was not an
inconsiderable cost. It was estimated that the cost of Territorial Defense Forces
was the equivalent of 1 percent of Yugoslavia’s Gross Domestic Product
(GDP).16 Finally, what does distinguish the Yugoslav case from many Warsaw
Pact members was its extensive indigenous armaments industry. For example,
circa 1973, the Yugoslav armaments industry provided approximately 55 per-
cent of the country’s own requirements, largely from licensing agreements with
the Soviet Union, as well as platforms and systems based on Yugoslav indigen-
ous design.17
State of logistics in legacy defense institutions
Post-Soviet
In the Soviet system the ideology of manufacturing and its emphasis on
quantity, at the expense of quality, an obsession with inputs and ignorance of
outputs (let alone outcomes), the need for centralized control, and the
assumption of omnipotence at the top, all combined to provide the Soviet
Red Army with a massive and costly logistic support structure. These legacy
concepts and supporting assumptions are still quite visible in post-Soviet
republics. An inherent weakness of these concepts is that they are highly
inefficient and are arguably incapable of supplying an armed force effectively
12See H. Menderhausen, Territorial Defense in NATO and Non-NATO Europe, R-1184-ISA, RAND, Santa Monica, 1973,
p. 85.
13B. Dimitrijevic, op. cit., p. 28.
14See S. Drljevic, ‘The Role of Geo-Political, Socio-Economic, and Military-Strategic Factors’, in The Yugoslav Concept
of General People’s Defense, Mejunarodna Politika, Belgrade, 1970, p. 216.
15M. Pantelic, ‘The System and Organization of National Defense’, Yugoslav Survey, 10(2) (1969), p. 6.
16See US Congress, Library of Congress, Country Studies, Yugoslavia, Territorial Defense Forces, December 1990,
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+yu0183)
17A. Roberts, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defense, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1976, p.
195; A. Bebler, ‘The Yugoslav Crisis and the “Yugoslav People’s Army”’, Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und
Konfliktforschung, 23 (1992), pp. 10–11.
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outside of their prescribed operational plans developed by the Main
Operations Directorate of a General Staff. In other words, it is problematic
to assume that these logistical concepts would have any degree of flexibility
to support maneuvers on a modern battlefield. Indeed, ‘logistics’ is possibly
the wrong term to be used in this context, as in keeping with their Soviet
legacy, successor armed forces continue to define this activity as ‘supply’, i.e.,
purchasing needed items (e.g., in Armenia’s approach to logistics).18 Perhaps
it is due to the fact that logistics consists of property, processes, and financial
arrangements all embedded in laws and regulations, that its conceptual
change has been so challenging, and it is difficult to find instances where
there has been fundamental conceptual transformation. Thus, the observa-
tion made by one author in the case of Azerbaijan that ‘ . . . logistics are now
on par to the standards promoted by NATO in various action plans that
Azerbaijan has implemented’19 is simply difficult to accept. How a pro-
foundly legacy armed force could hope to understand the Western concept
of logistics, let alone implement it in an armed force that remains based on
Communist concepts, leaves the neutral observer unconvinced.
That said, in the Baltic States the adoption of Western logistics concepts
has proceeded, particularly in light of Alliance membership.20 However, there
apparently remain vestiges of legacy ‘push’ assumptions embedded in the
context of fixed territorial defense. While these armed forces have been on
operations, the concept of ‘pull’ logistics has become de rigueur as these
forces have been integrated into larger NATO nations’ armed forces. To a
large extent, when placed in the proper context of the Baltic States, an
argument can be made that this conceptual duality is justified. Territorial
defense, or ‘total defense’,21 is not necessarily inimical to the overriding
NATO basic concept of collective defense. Indeed, in light of the fact that
Norway and Denmark have long followed such a concept, and given their
size and resources, some have argued that territorial defense is an eminently
well-suited concept in the case of the Baltic States.22 Yet, other commentators
have argued that the application of this concept is more nuanced than
18A. Yenokyan, ‘Country Study: Armenia’, in P. H. Fluri and V. Cibotaru (eds.), Defense Institution Building: Country
Profiles and Needs Assessments for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova: Background Materials, Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, 2008, p. 18.
19K. Makili-Aliyev, ‘Azerbaijan’, in M. Majer (ed.), Security Sector Reform in Countries of Visegrad and Southern
Caucasus: Challenges and Opportunities, Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA), Bratislava, 2013,
p. 31.
20Latvia’s ambitious objectives to develop its logistics structures and procedures in anticipation of Alliance
membership are detailed in Latvia, Report on the State Defence Policy and Armed Forces Development, Ministry
of Defence, Riga, 2004, pp. 32–34.
21As officially defined by the Estonia Parliamentary, Total Defense consists of: ‘1) military defence, 2) civilian sector
support to military defence, 3) international activities, 4) the internal security effort, 5) securing critical infrastructure,
and 6) psychological defence’: K. Salu and E. Männik, ‘Estonia’, in H. Biehl, B. Giegerich, and A. Jonas (eds.), ‘Strategic
Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies across the Continent’, Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Militärgeschichte
und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, Vol. 13, Springer VS, Wiesbaden, 2013, p. 105.
22See M. P. Davis, ‘An Historical and Political Overview of the Reserve and Guard Forces of the Nordic Countries at
the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century’, Baltic Security and Defence Review, 10 (2008), pp. 171–201.
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appears given such stark differences between the highly economically devel-
oped and homogeneous former, with the smaller, less-developed and more
heterogeneous populated latter.23 Be that as it may, there remains strong
support, to varying degrees within the Baltic States (particularly Estonia)24
for a fixed territorial defense inclination, if not overt orientation. In this
particular model, units’ mission sets perforce can be severely limited and tied
to a fixed territorial location. Therefore, an element of ‘push’ logistics could
arguably make sense given the limited envisaged geographic area of opera-
tion and the narrow tasks to be performed. Conversely, fixed assets and
delimited tactical tasks for maneuver forces on a modern dynamic battlefield
is equally problematic. What is often lost in the larger context of other post-
Soviet republics is the inherent inefficiencies of continuing to use legacy
‘supply’ assumptions and tables in an era when it is very unlikely that any of
these countries will ever employ ‘mass’ operational concepts in a conflict. In
light of such a change in operational orientation, it only makes sense to move
toward adopting more deeply the ‘pull’ concept, if for no other important
reason than for the sake of achieving efficiencies.
A detailed case of the challenges facing these defense institutions when
addressing the reform of logistics is provided by Ukraine, which demon-
strates the challenges of the task as well as provides an important case study
of the effectiveness of legacy logistics concepts on the modern battlefield.
Prior to the 2010 change in the Presidency (from Viktor Yushchenko to
Viktor Yanukovych), reforming logistics was a priority in the State Program
of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Development during 2006–2011, which
envisaged the establishment of a single support system to improve flexibility
of providing support to operational units.25 This was envisaged to be
achieved through the reform of the ‘Rear Area Services’, making it more
responsive to the needs of commanders. President Yanukovych ended these
initiatives and directed that there would be a centralized depot in each of the
country’s oblasts (regions), which regional governments had financial obliga-
tions for, as well as claims on, all as part of a move to adopt a territorial
defense orientation but facing the West.26 Yet the crucial missing factor has
long been the lack of any military logistical management of the supply and
23This argument is addressed well by H. von Riekhoff, ‘Civil-Military Relations in the Baltic States’, in N.
Mychajlyszyn and H. von Riekhoff (eds.), The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in East-Central Europe and the
Former Soviet Union, Praeger, Westport, CT, 2004, pp. 106–107.
24H. Mölder, ‘The Development of Military Cultures’, in T. Lawrence and T. Jermalavičius (eds.), Apprenticeship,
Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of Defence Development in the Baltic States, International Centre for
Defence Studies, Tallinn, 2013, p. 108. This skepticism aside, Mölder makes a strong point that ‘. . . Estonia has
taken its commitments to NATO very seriously. Despite its strong commitment to the Nordic model of military
culture and suspicions of the European model, Estonia continues to support the transformation of NATO and the
EU’s CSDP in promoting cooperative security approaches for the current security environment’.
25O. Ostapets, ‘Guidelines of the State Programme of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Development during 2006–2011:
Outsourcing in the Ukrainian Armed Forces’, Defense and Security Policy Center, Kyiv, Defense Bulletin, 5 (2010), p. 17.
26Ukraine, Ministry of Defense, White Book 2014, Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ministry of Defense, Kyiv, 2015, pp.
11–12.
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distribution of supplies to units, i.e., the conflict in Eastern Ukraine has
demonstrated the need for a military organization to be responsible for the
supply of needed stores to deployed units on the battlefield. The current
supply system remains based on requisitions, made in writing, which are
reviewed/approved by the General Staff, distributed to various depots scat-
tered across the country, and which are not linked by a common software
management system.27 Unity of effort was obviously not facilitated by the
introduction of some Western concepts while keeping key legacy organiza-
tions. For instance, the Directorates of the Armament of the Armed Forces
and the Logistics of the Armed Forces are under the Ministry of Defense.
Conversely, the Main Directorate of Operational Support of the Armed
Forces resides in the General Staff.28 It is little wonder, then, that
Volunteers and NGOs have been critical in providing needed supplies to
Ukrainian forces fighting in Eastern Ukraine.29
The Ukrainian case should constitute sober reading for officials in the
region attempting to reform their own logistics structures as to the dangers of
adopting elements of Western concepts while leaving their related legacy
counterparts functioning (and, ergo, producing conceptual dissonance). If
one accepts that the rationale for adopting a ‘pull’ logistics system is compel-
ling from both operational effectiveness and financial efficiencies, the decen-
tralization of authority of what is required to enable such a transformation of
logistics principles is likely intimidating and explains why this has not been
achieved to date. A culture that has the characteristic of ‘high power
distance’30 will struggle with the ambition to enable tactical formations and
junior officers and NCOs to determine requirements. Fundamentally, for a
‘pull’ logistics system to work, commanders need to be empowered to under-
take tactical and operational planning. As an element of operational planning
as practiced by Western armed forces, there must be an organic tactical
capability to support the operational planning process by creating logistics
estimates. This requires experienced logisticians on the staff of all tactical
formations. This will be a huge challenge for these countries. Given the fact
that tactical formations in post-Soviet armed forces largely do not have
‘staffs’, as they are expected solely to execute and not to ‘think’, there are
insufficient numbers of officers or NCOs to develop such needed estimates.
27This lacuna is being addressed by NATO and the donation of supply management software. See North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, ‘NATO’s Practical Support to Ukraine’, Fact Sheet, Bruxelles, February 2015.
28See organizational chart of these organizations in Ukraine, White Book 2014, 2014, p. 73–74.
29There is little formally published on the activities of the Volunteers and civil society’s efforts to support the
defense of Ukraine. Firsthand reports from soldiers at the front are numerous and explicit in their praise of
Volunteers and criticism of the defense institution and particularly senior military officials. See, for example,
‘Ukrainian Soldier Speaks—This Is Our Stalingrad: What It’s Like to Serve on the War’s Front Line’, 7 August 2015,
http://warisboring.com/articles/this-is-our-stalingrad/.
30The extent to which the less-powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and
accept that power is distributed unequally. See The Hofstede Centre, Strategy, Culture, Change, http://geert-
hofstede.com/countries.html.
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Equally challenging is the fact that many defense institutions largely conflate
logistics with acquisition, and in consequence these responsibilities reside in
Ministries of Defense. Therefore, armed forces play a minor role in deter-
mining logistical responsibilities via integrated planning even in the General
Staff, as there is no tradition of a G-4 directorate. Given the enormity of the
task of institutional change, it is probably safe to assume that the reform of
logistics structures will be among the last elements of the defense institution
to undergo reform in these republics.
Post-Warsaw Pact
These defense institutions have faced the challenge of adapting to new
operational concepts to conduct expeditionary operations (both peacekeep-
ing and major combat operations), while at the same time remaining saddled
with predominantly legacy concepts, platforms, and weapon systems. Under
normal circumstances, one might have expected an organization requiring
such a fundamentally different orientation in its most basic activities and
operations to adopt an incremental and/or phased reform program. After all,
to alter the manner in which legacy platforms and systems could be sup-
ported is likely to prove difficult, given that their operational employment
was likely left unchanged in most cases. Critically, a phased approach also
would require the likelihood of dual structures and separate procedures,
expensive capacities in a time when most defense budgets have been flat.
Consequently, these armed forces have been moving forward — however, at
different speeds, to be sure — to reform their logistics organizations. For
instance, the Hungarian Strategic Defense Review of 1998 envisaged reform-
ing the defense institution’s logistics structures by adopting, inter alia,
Western principles of privatization, outsourcing, civilianization, and inte-
grated supply structures, all with the view of cost savings.31
It should be stressed that Western logistics systems are premised on a
number of key principles, e.g., transparency and accountability, i.e., inimi-
table to legacy logic. Consequently, they have not been easily adopted in all of
these countries, and even worse, many of them are ‘adopted’ in words only,
while the substance remains actually unchanged (‘façade adoption’). In the
case of Romania, Watts documents how early in the reform process officials
associated with the acquisitions and property management element of the
defense institution were none too keen to see the introduction of the liberal
democratic concept of transparency. Accountability was also stymied by the
existence of a parallel budgeting process (which ended only in 2001) whereby
funds for acquisitions and property management fell under the authority of
31Z. Szenes, ‘The Implications of NATO Expansion for Civil-Military Relations in Hungary’, in D. Betz and J.
Löwenhardt (eds.), Army and State in Postcommunist Europe, Frank Cass, London, 2001, p. 91.
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the General Staff, as opposed to the Ministry of Defense. The delay to remove
these responsibilities from the armed forces needlessly postponed civilian
oversight of this important function.32 Lastly, all of these countries have
suffered from unclear institutional responsibilities and functions in almost
all areas of national support to the armed forces. Nowhere is dysfunctional
decision making made so embarrassingly public than in the case of a major
procurement process, when mishandled. An excellent example of this is the
untidy procurement by Poland of replacement multirole fighter aircraft.33
According to Gogolewska, the Polish defense institution suffered from the
predictable legacy pathologies: unclear division of functions among depart-
ments, overlapping responsibilities, poor coordination of work among var-
ious cells, and as a result, disjointed decision-making processes.34
As a general observation, one can see nevertheless where these allied defense
institutions have, to varying degrees, adopted Western nomenclature and orga-
nizations, if not fully the concepts upon which they are founded. To their credit,
a number of countries, e.g., Czech Republic, started early on to reform this
important element of their armed forces.35 This endeavor has presented no small
challenge, given that their legacy structures were designed to keep the organic
support planning and execution structures small and concentrated at opera-
tional and even national levels. The supporting system that was built around
army, corps, and divisional structures with all of the support assets were con-
trolled at the top of these structures. Therefore, there has been a need for a
concerted effort to redefine the logistics institution to enable the armed forces
both to participate in expeditionary operations, let alone alongside allies in
Article 5 missions. What one finds, however, is no small degree of conceptual
incoherence. In the case of Poland, for instance, there are visible and recogniz-
able Western organizations (e.g., a J-4 in the General Staff) and a Support
Inspectorate acting as the Central Logistics Authority that has the responsibility
to support the armed forces both abroad and in-country. Encouragingly, there
are two logistic brigades (the 1st Logistics Brigade Headquarters in Bydgoszcz,
and southern Poland with the 10th Logistics Brigade Headquarters in Opole),
yet there are also 53 depots spread across the country, which suggests a con-
tinued strong orientation toward fixed territorial defense.36
32L. L. Watts, ‘Stressed and Strained Civil-Military Relations in Romania, but Successfully Reforming’, in H. Born, M.
Caparini, K. W. Haltiner, and J. Kuhlmann (eds.), Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and
Institutional Change, Routledge, New York, 2006, p. 23.
33L. Dycka and M. Mares, ‘The Development and Future of Fighter Planes Acquisition in Countries of the Visegrad
Group’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 25(4) (2012), pp. 544–546; 555.
34A. Gogolewska, ‘Problems Confronting Civilian Democratic Control in Poland’, in H. Born, M. Caparini, K. W.
Haltiner, and J. Kuhlmann (eds.), Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and Institutional Change,
Routledge, New York, 2006, p. 110.
35For a dated, but informative, review of initial efforts on the part of the Czech Army to initiate elements of
Western logistics concepts and organization, see S. Lefebvre, ‘The Army of the Czech Republic: A Status Report’,
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 8(4) (1995), p. 731.
36A. Slodczyk, ‘Challenges in Logistic Support for Polish Armed Forces’, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War
College, 10 March 2010, pp. 5–6.
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Post-Yugoslav
The JNA, along with its Romanian counterpart,37 was doctrinally based on
the principle of Total National Defense. As such, the JNA logistics concept
was based on supporting the conscript JNA maneuver force in the field and
the individual republic Territorial Defense Forces that would be engaged in
circumscribed defensive and resistance operations. These concepts envisaged
interior lines of communications and an extensive network of logistics
depots, supported by a large and geographically dispersed defense industrial
base. The economic coherence of the former Yugoslavia’s defense industrial
base largely dissipated with the implosion of Yugoslavia and subsequent civil
wars. The communist managerial practice of overriding market forces to
spread defense industry throughout the country (and particularly to exploit
the defensive nature of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s terrain)38 could not survive
independence, except in Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia. Where it has survived,
defense industries remain either as an element of the defense institution or
enjoy close connection to them.39
On independence, a continuation of the concept of territorial defense,
supported by legacy concepts and infrastructure, was not a terribly proble-
matic option, for after conflicts ended the mission-focus of the armed forces
was initially modest and largely limited to securing their new borders and
developing basic capabilities to support sovereignty protection.40 With join-
ing NATO’s Partnership for Peace and contributing forces to peacekeeping
operations, legacy fixed territorial-based logistics concepts increasingly
needed to be reviewed with the objective of revising them. Croatia acknowl-
edged the need to change its existing territorial-based force structure in 2005:
‘the armed forces are more likely expected to take part in operations abroad
rather than at home’.41 Yet, the challenge to achieve this objective has
remained elusive. In its 2013 Strategic Defence Review Croatia acknowledged
that this objective has yet to be achieved.42 Certainly, one would have
thought that the adoption of NATO nations’ concepts, such as expeditionary
logistics and increasingly relying on the civilian sector’s logistics backbone
via commercial and HNS arrangements, would have become a sine qua non.
37A. Alexiev, ‘The Romanian Army’, in J. R. Adelman (ed.), Communist Armies in Politics, Westview Press, Boulder,
1982, pp. 156–159.
38See C. R. Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992–1994, Texas A&M University
Press, College Station, 2003, pp. 17–18.
39There is little substantive academic treatment of the Serbian defense industrial sector. A general description can
be found in Serbia, Ministry of Defense, Strategic Planning Department, Defence Policy Sector, White Paper on
Defence of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, 2010, pp. 112–114; ‘UK Trade and Investment Market Brief: Serbia’,
London, 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/283300/UKTI_
DSO_Market_Brief_Serbia.pdf.
40ʻThe existing armed forces structure [of Croatia] has been oriented towards developing and maintaining
territorial-based self-defense capabilities’. Croatia, Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defence Review, Zagreb, 10
November 2005, p. 15.
41Ibid., pp. 15 and 17.
42Vlada Republike Hrvatske, Strateški Pregled Obrane, (No. 73/2013), 25 July 2013, p. 30.
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To be generous, one can assess progress in this area to have been modest.
Legacy concepts, assumptions, and organizations remain entrenched in law,
regulation, norms — and most challenging — within the training and
education institutions in these countries. Thus, to varying degrees, one still
finds ‘push’ logistics present within the individual and collective mentality of
these defense institutions and armed forces.
Perhaps given the general limited expertise regarding defense outside of
the armed forces in these countries (Slovenia being a major exception), there
has been limited understanding among the political classes of these countries
about the potential efficiencies that could be found by adopting modern
logistics concepts. And, to be fair, the particularly JNA legacy that relates
to infrastructure was not terribly conducive to enabling civil officials to frame
properly the problem they face. Legacy ‘assumptions’ remain unchallenged/
unassessed as they relate to managing the sprawling post-JNA defense estate
in these republics. To give one an idea of the size of this particular problem,
in the case of Montenegro, in 2010 it declared that it possessed 240 defense-
related institutions that required it to spend 220,000 euros per year simply to
guard them.43 Further complicating consolidation is the continued JNA
practice whereby utilities and consumable expenses at bases were not man-
aged and financed locally but rather were centralized, thereby removing
incentives by which local commanders and base managers could optimally
and efficiently manage resources.44 Likewise, residual Serbian defense indus-
tries continue to exist, but with the stated proviso that they must be increas-
ingly self-sufficient. That said, their mere existence needs to be carefully
considered as they perpetuate the legacy practice of intellectually focusing
the defense institution to procurement and acquisition of the products of
these industries, rather than turning the question around to ask: what do the
armed forces need to enable them to execute their new missions, i.e.,
expeditionary operations, or possibly even a more mobile and operationally
maneuverable territorial defense required by the transition to a smaller and
professional force? This requires a completely different approach, as it con-
centrates responsibility for the development of support requirements at the
tactical level under the direction of Service Chiefs and Joint Operations
Commanders, and not from the top, i.e., at Ministries of Defense.
There has been only modest reform progress in most countries.
Macedonia was able to develop and publish a basic national logistics concept
in 2004, which has provided the basis for the development of subsequent and
procedural manuals. Yet, for the full implementation of a ‘pull’ logistics
concept to take hold, the entire armed forces need to change. The
43Montenegro, Strategic Defense Review of Montenegro, Podgorica, Ministry of Defense, June 2010, p. 57.
44See interview with former Serbian Minister of Defense Dragan Sutanovac, who discusses these challenges in,
‘Change of Pace, Country Briefing: Serbia’, Janes Defence Weekly, 7 September 2011, p. 34.
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Montenegrin logistic capabilities remain very modest and are largely based
on depots and the services providing for their own requirements, as needed.
Related to all armed forces, to adopt fully Western concepts tactical units will
require trained and experienced NCOs and officers to draft accurate logistics
estimates, and concomitantly, existing organizations throughout the entire
defense institution need to be reviewed to determine if their continued
existence is required. Delegation of financial authority to lower-level com-
manders and staff is needed to enable the full implementation of HNS
agreements in order to obtain cost-effective support from commercial sup-
pliers, either within a country, or on deployments. Moreover, in order to
move toward adopting a modern supply system, a dedicated IT backbone and
software is needed and has been slow in coming to many of these countries.
In one case, operational logistics planning was sidetracked by the terribly
mistaken belief that this could take place within an imported US model of
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting system (PPBS). In short, this is one
area of defense management and planning where legacy assumptions and
principles persist, are often ignored, and go dangerously unaddressed, all the
while they continue to bleed defense budgets, while not providing the armed
forces with the support they will need to meet currently declared, let alone
future, missions.
Impediments to change
Since the end of the Cold War, what one can observe is that within legacy
defense institutions, ‘logistics’ has slowly been adopted as the widely accepted
name of this activity, but Western concepts that support the term have not
fully taken hold as a general observation. The question that begs to be posed
is, why is it that the adoption of Western logistics has been so challenging for
these defense institutions? The author posits that the key obstacle to adopting
Western logistics practices is due to the nature of legacy concepts that are
enshrined in law, institutions, training, and formations. In Table 1, one can
see a vivid representation of Western and legacy concepts as they relate to the
support of armed forces. It is arguable that these concepts are antithetical. In
consequence, they are not capable of coexisting in a functional sense in an
institution. As one officer from a Central European country stated to the
author, the admixture of legacy and Western logistical concepts in his armed
forces has inadvertently produced a hybrid logistical (a ‘push-pull’) system
that is simply dysfunctional. The continued practice of allowing these con-
cepts to continue to drive the logistic support elements of these armed forces
is not inconsequential to them being capable of preforming on operations.
Either through the active or passive utilization of the concepts, their negative
effect on the effectiveness and efficiency of these defense institutions is
palpable. For instance, the continued legacy practice of centralizing decision
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making of logistics works against the Western concept of delegated com-
mand that empowers commanders via the utilization of the ‘pull’ logistics
concept. Taking the centralization point further, the continued existence of
state-owned defense industry co-opts the delegation of maintenance respon-
sibilities to tactical units.45 While there is no argument that NATO members
in particular should be able to provide for their own national defense (as
articulated in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty),46 one could take issue
with the continued practice of maintaining fixed supply depots, rather than
creating greater logistical capability to support operational mobility. Thus,
one can only hope that the Polish logistics system of fielding two mobile
support brigades and 53 supply depots (the latter constituting fixed targets) is
still in the midst of transition to a more mobile force.
Another contributing factor to impeding change has been an atrophying of
the operational orientation and purpose of logistics. Since the end of the Cold
War, very few armies have fundamentally changed their tactical unit struc-
tures. For example, in legacy structures, battalion command posts were
expected only to execute orders (e.g., in some cases, consisting only of a
commander, driver, and signals NCO) and did not even possess a second
command post with redundant communications, thereby precluding them
for delivering logistic support, as is the practice in the West via the Estimates
Table 1. Antithetical Logistical Concepts.
Principles Logistics Rear Area (Security)










Armed forces determine what society must provide
Key assumption Decentralized Centralized
Customers Lower-level operational
commanders
General Staffs, higher-level operational commanders





General Staff via centralized operational planning
Execution ‘Pull’ by commanders ‘Push’ by General Staff
Characteristics: ● Flexibility, with inherent
need to supply all units
● Maintenance is operationally
focused
● Software-based
● Rigidity and predictability, allows battlefield
exploitation, but abandons some units
● Maintenance is largely provided by defense indus-
try and locked to it
● Paper-based
45For an intriguing discussion of the differences between the concept of maintenance, as it is understood in a
Western sense, with its legacy counterpart, ‘technical assurance’, see D. Lapadat, ‘Evolutions in the Romanian
Armed Forces Logistics: From Technical Assurance to System Life Cycle Management’, Romanian Military Thinking,
3 (2014), pp. 104–113.
46Article 3 states that Allies, through ‘self-help’ and ‘mutual aid’, will develop ‘their individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack’.
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process. In all too many legacy armies, these have still yet to be created,
let alone understood, even in some new NATO countries. Moreover, follow-
ing the Cold War the subsequent adoption by many countries of territorial
defense concepts resulted in stores being based near units (e.g., Poland). The
pernicious result of such decisions has been the atrophying of dedicated
transport/supply. To save money, defense institutions have cut exercises
severely, so supply training has come to be seen as an unnecessary activity
and has been lost (e.g., Ukraine). As acknowledged by Bulgarian officials,
military medical services have also become territorially localized and have
become completely hospital-based, at the expense of being capable of deploy-
ing field medical facilities.47 As a result of these trends, Ministries of Defense
have come to exercise active control over one part of the logistic system, i.e.,
procurement, thereby reinforcing this as the dominating concept in these
organizations. A consequence of this evolution is that few legacy defense
institutions support deployed forces on their own, and one can question how
capable they would be of supporting maneuvers for any length of time even
on their own or neighboring territory. They are simply lacking in the
necessary personnel, doctrine, deployable support units, or requisite training
arguably to accomplish either.
Solutions
Clearly, bridging this deep conceptual divide will not be easily accomplished,
nor will this be accomplished quickly. Fundamentally, what is needed in
these legacy defense institutions is a new ‘policy framework’ that necessitates
the wholesale review and revision of all associated concepts and assumptions
that relate to logistics. Policy framework in this context is defined as the
practice that all activities within the organization adhere to the policies and
priorities established in the framework whose purpose is to create defined
outcomes. Critical to the success of any reform effort must be the practice of
tying money to reform, which could very likely imply being done in a
mutually exclusive manner apropos existing organizations. Some key issues
that require attention and revision include:
(1) New national logistics concepts that redistribute the roles and missions
between Ministers of Defense and General Staffs. For example, Ministry of
Defenses’ supply directorates must be realigned to be responsible more for
how to buy what is needed by the armed forces, as opposed to what.
(2) Logisticsmust be defined in the new policy framework as constitutingmore
than procurement, outputs from state-owned defense industry, which are
47Bulgaria, White Paper on Defence and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria, Ministry of Defense, Sofia, 2010,
p. 65.
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all depot-based and centrally determined. In essence, logistics needs to be
defined in policy and concept that constitutesmeeting thematerial require-
ments of commanders.
(3) Ministries of Defense need to collate and validatematerial requirements but
allow defense agencies to manage acquisition.
(a) Tactical formations must be able to determine their logistics
requirements, via the Estimates process, rather than being deter-
mined centrally by General Staffs.
(b) State-owned defense industries need to be privatized. They bleed
defense budgets, rarely provide what commanders need and at the
quality commanders expect, and offer huge opportunities for
corruption.
(4) Decision-making authority for particularly consumable purchases
must be decentralized to create efficiencies.
(a) Commanders must be able to determine how to use infrastructure
resources, as opposed to being managed centrally. Budgets for consum-
ables need to be selectively delegated to commanders and formations.
(Utilities are still invoiced centrally in many countries, and this must be
delegated to commanders with incentives to encourage the saving of
money.)
(b) Greater policy emphasis must be placed on out-sourcing where it
achieves efficiencies, except where the forces require the capability for
deployments. The practice needs to stop whereby depots try to provide
all supply requirements while ignoring opportunities at out-sourcing
and using the global civilian logistics backbone.
When formulating policies to assist legacy defense institutions to reform their
logistics concepts and organizations, Western planning assumptions equally need
to be fundamentally reviewed and revised to include the following factors:
(1) Understand that the Western concept of logistics, as an operational
enabler, is not fully understood in legacy defense institutions.
(2) Critically, there is an immediate need for defense institutions to create
military logistics supply organizations, which include commanders, head-
quarters, dedicated and redundant communications, and transport.
(3) As Communist and Western defense concepts are antithetical, it must be
understood that they cannot coexist in the same institution.
(a) Western officials must insist as a precondition to assisting the reform of
legacy ‘logistics’ organizations that recipient countries must accept the
concept of mutual exclusivity. Thus, new concepts can only be intro-
duced when their legacy counterparts have been retired, i.e., organiza-
tions must change and staff be retrained.
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(b) Failure to retire legacy concepts will result in a mishmash of concepts
that will struggle among themselves and produce dissonance and waste
(i.e., conceptual spaghetti).
(4) Only within the context of a new logistic policy framework should
Western support shift to including logistics commanders and staff on
Western exercises. Related is the important necessity of ensuring that
legacy armed forces are introduced to, and supported in, the develop-
ment of the estimates process.
Conclusion
That there are considerable challenges to European Communist-legacy defense
institutions to overcome before they can fully embrace Western logistics concepts
there should be little doubt. A number of factors have contributed to the situation
where change has been impeded as specifically related to logistics. Legacy laws,
organizational structures, weapon systems, and platforms have combined tomake
the transition to the Western logistics model difficult. However, what has been
missed by many Western officials is the lack of recognition and understanding of
the dominant role played by the persistence of legacy logistics concepts, i.e., Soviet
Military Economic Science. As argued in this essay, there should be little doubt
that legacy logistics concepts are not merely different from theirWestern counter-
parts; they are antithetical, and as such, cannot coexist together in the same
organization. It is little wonder, therefore, that Western advice and assistance
has been generally unsuccessful in enabling these defense institutions to effect
fundamental change in the orientation of their approach to the support of their
armed forces.
The challenge, therefore, both to legacy defense institutions, as well as Western
donors of advice and assistance, is twofold. First, any assistance in this area that can
possibly hope to be meaningful must address the wide gap between Western and
legacy logistics concepts. That the gap is wide is clear, but what is less well-
understood is that these concepts are mutually exclusive. Thus, legacy defense
institutions must accept that without a systematic approach that replaces legacy
concepts in concert with the introduction of new, modern, and Western
approaches, these efforts have a very poor outlook for success, just as poor as
their current track record of achievements. An intriguing proposal to discern a
successful change method could be to experiment with the creation of parallel
organizations, with newly trained personnel, based on Western concepts and
supported by new operating assumptions with the objective of creating new
institutional logic. As Western concepts are progressively implemented, their
legacy counterparts and their home organizations can be closed. Second, it
needs to be understood that the only means by which legacy logistics concepts
can be identified, replaced, and new Western ones introduced into these defense
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institutions is through changes in national-level policy. This is a profoundly
political issue that needs to be addressed within Ministries of Defense with input
from armed forces. By extension, therefore, Western and Eastern defense officials
need to acknowledge that the challenge is not one that can be successfully framed,
let alone addressed, as a solely technical military problem that can be successfully
addressed through the provision of Western training, particularly at the tactical
level.
In the end, the experience of NATO and its nations of providing logistics
support to legacy armed forces on peacekeeping and combat deployments,
let alone conducting multinational logistics exercises, could well have unwit-
tingly masked the depth of the enduring reality of legacy logistics concepts.
By focusing on the external operational aspect of support of these armed
forces, the reality of the depth of the problem either went unnoticed or
ignored. However, in a Europe where Russia has adopted a more muscular
foreign policy toward its neighbors, there should be new immediacy to
recognizing the need to reform the logistics capabilities of legacy defense
institutions. Addressing the conceptual challenge should be a priority, from
which all other advice and assistance should flow and support.
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